When National Parks Become Havens of Terror: Reclaiming Nigeria’s Protected Landscapes for Sustainable National Security || By Dr. Rafiu Babatunde Ibrahim (PhD)

INTRODUCTION 

There is something deeply disturbing about the idea that places established to protect life, nature and the heritage of a nation could gradually become places from which death, fear and destruction are unleashed upon citizens. Yet this is increasingly becoming a painful reality in parts of Nigeria.Without the doubt, Nigeria’s national parks were once celebrated as sanctuaries of biodiversity, havens for rare wildlife, and symbols of the nation’s commitment to environmental conservation. Today, these vast forested landscapes have acquired a more sinister reputation.

National parks were never created to serve as hiding places for bandits, kidnappers, terrorists, arms traffickers or other criminal networks. They were established to conserve biodiversity, protect wildlife and ecosystems, promote scientific research and environmental education, support tourism and recreation, preserve cultural heritage and contribute to national development. Nigeria’s National Park Service itself recognises national parks as instruments of conservation, ecotourism, economic diversification and even national security.

But something has gone seriously wrong.

Across parts of southern and northern Nigeria, extensive forests, protected areas and poorly governed rural landscapes are increasingly being exploited by armed groups as sanctuaries, transit corridors, recruitment zones, logistical bases and hiding places. The Old Oyo National Park; Kainji Lake National Park and the wider Borgu-Kainji axis have become particularly worrying examples.

The question Nigerians must now ask is not merely: How do we flush criminals out of our forests? The more fundamental question is: How did nationally protected landscapes become sufficiently ungoverned for armed groups to establish themselves there in the first place-and how do we redesign their management so that this never happens again? This is where security, environmental management and urban and regional planning must converge.

NIGERIA’S NATIONAL PARKS: A NATIONAL ASSET UNDER THREAT

The history of Nigeria’s national park system is relatively recent. The National Park Service was established in 1991 under Decree 36 with five national parks: Gashaka-Gumti, Kainji Lake, Cross River, Old Oyo and Chad Basin. Yankariwas converted from a game reserve into a national park in 1992. Two additional parks-Kamuku and Okomu-were established in 1999. Yankari was subsequently removed from the national park system in 2006 following a request by the Bauchi State Government. Nigeria therefore currently has seven national parks.

According to the National Park Service, the seven parks cover approximately 22,206 square kilometres-an enormous territorial resource. They contain ecosystems ranging from savannah and wetlands to tropical forests, mountains and riverine landscapes, supporting more than 1,340 animal species, including 274 mammalian species.

These parks are not empty lands. They are strategic ecological, economic, cultural and territorial assets.

Their current distribution and approximate sizes are as follows:

These figures are from the National Park Service.

The sheer size of these territories immediately presents a planning and security challenge. Protecting 22,206 square kilometres of ecologically sensitive land cannot depend exclusively on a few ranger stations, periodic patrols and conventional policing. It requires territorial governance.

A BRIEF ANATOMY OF NIGERIA’S NATIONAL PARKS

1. Gashaka-Gumti: Nigeria’s Mountainous Ecological Giant

At approximately 6,731 square kilometres, Gashaka-Gumti is Nigeria’s largest national park. Located in Adamawa and Taraba States, it encompasses extensive mountainous terrain, forests, grasslands, rivers and highly diverse wildlife habitats.Its topography, remoteness and extensive forest cover make it an ecological treasure. But precisely those characteristics also demonstrate a broader security principle: the more difficult anarea is to access, monitor and govern, the greater the possibility of its exploitation by non-state actors. The challenge therefore is not to militarise Gashaka-Gumtiindiscriminately, but to ensure that remoteness does not become synonymous with absence of government.

2. Kainji Lake: The Security Wake-Up Call

Kainji Lake National Park is arguably the most urgent example of the security implications of poorly governed protected landscapes. The park covers approximately 5,382 square kilometres and consists of two non-contiguous sectors: Borgu, approximately 3,970 km², and Zugurma, approximately 1,371 km². It spans Niger and Kwara States and is strategically positioned within a wider landscape connecting northwestern and north-central Nigeria with the borders of Benin and Niger. Kainji is also historically significant. It was Nigeria’s first national park, established in 1979. Its ecological importance should therefore have made it one of Nigeria’s most carefully managed landscapes. Instead, parts of the Kainji forest corridor have increasingly become associated with banditry, kidnapping and extremist activity.

A recent investigation reported that the approximately 5,340-square-kilometre Kainji forest became a hideout for jihadists and bandit groups, with armed groups exploiting the dense vegetation, limited state presence and porous borders. The investigation also documented extensive deforestation and illegal timber activity within the park. This is no longer simply an environmental-management problem. It is a national territorial-security problem.

3. Cross River: Forest Conservation of Global Importance

Cross River National Park, approximately 4,000 square kilometres, contains some of Nigeria’s most important tropical forest ecosystems. It is divided into the Oban and Okwangwodivisions. Its forests are valuable for biodiversity, watershed protection, climate regulation, scientific research and ecotourism. The challenge here is different from the Kainji situation: the priority should be to prevent illegal logging, poaching, encroachment and other activities from gradually weakening state presence.

4. Old Oyo: Heritage, Archaeology and Conservation

Old Oyo National Park, approximately 2,512 square kilometres, lies in Oyo State. It is particularly important because it combines ecological conservation with historical and cultural heritage associated with the old Oyo civilisation.The park demonstrates that national parks are not simply forests containing animals. They can simultaneously constitute cultural landscapes, archaeological landscapes and economic landscapes. Old Oyo should therefore be developed as an integrated heritage, conservation and ecotourism landscape while ensuring that surrounding communities become stakeholders rather than excluded populations.

5. Chad Basin: A Park in a Complex Security Environment

Chad Basin National Park, approximately 2,258 square kilometres, spans parts of Borno and Yobe States and contains wetlands, savannah ecosystems, oases and other habitats. Its location within the wider Lake Chad Basin places it within one of Africa’s most complex security environments. The lesson from Chad Basin is obvious: environmental governance cannot be separated from regional security governance.

6. Kamuku: The Kaduna Frontier

Kamuku National Park in Kaduna State covers approximately 1,121 square kilometres. Its proximity to communities and rural corridors within Kaduna makes effective landscape management essential. The park must be protected from becoming part of the wider forest corridors used by criminal groups moving between rural settlements and states.

7. Okomu: Small in Size, Enormous in Value

Okomu National Park in Edo State is the smallest of Nigeria’s seven national parks, at approximately 202.24 square kilometres. Its relatively small size makes it potentially easier to monitor than some of the country’s gigantic parks, but its ecological value is immense. Okomu demonstrates that security planning for national parks must be context-specificrather than based on a one-size-fits-all model.

FROM SANCTUARIES OF NATURE TO SANCTUARIES OF CRIMINALITY

The transformation is frightening. Where government presence is weak, criminal groups can gradually develop alternative systems of control. They establish camps. They create informal routes. They exploit forests for concealment.They recruit local informants. They impose levies. They engage in illegal logging and other illicit economic activities.They monitor security movements. They exploit difficult terrain. And, eventually, they begin to exercise territorial influence over surrounding communities. This is precisely why the Kainji-Borgu situation deserves national attention.

The Institute for Security Studies has described the Borgu-Kainji axis as a convergence zone connecting parts of Nigeria with the borderlands of Benin and Niger, with Kainji Lake National Park situated at the centre of poorly governed forest corridors and rural communities. It reported that violent events involving jihadist groups in the region increased by 86 per cent between 2024 and 2025, while deaths increased by 262 per cent. This is an extraordinary warning. The problem is therefore larger than “bandits hiding in a forest.” It is the emergence of a security geography.

The Kainji-Borgu Warning

The January 2026 attack on Kasuwan Daji market in BorguLocal Government Area brought the danger dramatically into public consciousness. Reports said suspected bandits operating from the direction of the Kainji Lake National Park attacked the market, killed about 30 people and abducted others. Subsequent reports indicated intensified security operations around the Kainji Lake area. The Niger State Government even announced plans to resettle people living in hamlets around Kainji Lake as part of efforts to clear the forests and prevent criminal groups from using them as camps.

In June 2026, the Niger State Government stated that security forces had been deployed to Kainji Lake National Park to dislodge bandits and restore security to surrounding communities. These developments demonstrate that the problem has reached a point where ordinary policing is no longer sufficient.

The Recent Mass Kidnapping: A National Wake-Up Call

The latest events in Niger State make the matter even more urgent. In August 2026, armed groups attacked communities in the Borgu area of Niger State. Reports initially differed substantially about the number of abductees. Some local accounts put the number much lower, while a video subsequently circulated showing what residents identified as approximately 600 women, children and elderly people.

Reuters reported that President Bola Tinubu ordered the military and other security agencies to mount an immediate rescue operation and provide regular updates on the abductees. The same report stated that about 30 people had been killed and that approximately 2,000 residents reportedly fled to neighbouring Benin Republic. Reuters also cautioned that it could not independently verify the approximately 600 figure.

This qualification is important. Public discourse must distinguish between verified facts, local claims and emerging intelligence. But whatever the final number of abductees, the event is sufficiently grave to expose a fundamental weakness in Nigeria’s territorial security system.

The problem is compounded by the broader kidnapping crisis. A recent SBM Intelligence assessment reported approximately 7,825 kidnapping victims between July 2025 and June 2026, a 66 per cent increase over the preceding year, with at least 1,142 people killed and ransom payments estimated at approximately $5.79 million. These numbers tell us that kidnapping has evolved from isolated criminality into an economic and territorial enterprise.

WHY ARE NATIONAL PARKS VULNERABLE?

From an Urban and Regional Planning perspective, several factors are responsible:

1. The Problem of Spatial Vastness: A park measuring thousands of square kilometres cannot be effectively governed from one headquarters. There must be a hierarchy of control centres, ranger posts, communication nodes, access routes, observation points and emergency response facilities. Without spatial subdivision and territorial intelligence, enormous areas become invisible to government.

2. Poor Connectivity: Some protected landscapes have inadequate roads, bridges, communication infrastructure and emergency access. This produces an asymmetry: Criminal groups know the terrain and move through informal paths. Government forces often depend on limited formal routes. The criminal therefore enjoys a mobility advantage.

3. Weak Human Presence: A protected area cannot be effectively protected when surrounding communities perceive government as absent. A forest without legitimate economic activity, surveillance, community engagement and regular public-sector presence creates a vacuum. Someone will eventually fill that vacuum.

4. Porous Regional Boundaries: Kainji-Borgudemonstrates the problem of administrative fragmentation. The security landscape cuts across Niger, Kwara and Kebbi States and extends toward Benin and Niger Republic. Criminal networks do not respect state boundaries. Our security and planning institutions must therefore stop planning exclusively within administrative boundaries.

5. Illegal Economies: Illegal logging, charcoal production, poaching, mining, arms trafficking and kidnapping can interact. A forest can become an economic ecosystem for criminality. Recent investigations into Kainji have highlighted the relationship between illegal timber activities and terrorist networks.

6. Community Vulnerability: When communities around protected areas lack schools, healthcare, roads, markets, employment and security, criminal organisations can exploit poverty and grievances. The solution cannot therefore be purely military.

RECLAIMING THE NATIONAL PARKS: A NEW PLANNING PARADIGM

Nigeria needs nothing less than a National Parks Security and Spatial Development Programme. The programmeshould integrate environmental conservation, regional planning, community development, intelligence and national security.

First: Re-map Every National Park

The Federal Government should commission a comprehensive GIS-based spatial audit of all seven national parks.

Every park should be mapped into:

i. ecological zones;

ii. wildlife zones;

iii. community interfaces;

iv. access corridors;

v. waterways;

vi. settlements;

vii. illegal activity hotspots;

viii. ranger stations;

ix. security facilities;

x. evacuation routes;

xi. emergency landing zones;

xii. communication blackspots; and

xiii. transboundary movement corridors.

This should produce a National Protected Landscape Security Atlas. Satellite imagery, drones, remote sensing, GIS and geospatial artificial intelligence should be used to detect changes in forest cover, new tracks, illegal settlements, logging sites, suspicious clearings and other unusual activities.

Second: Divide Parks into Manageable Security and Planning Units

A 5,000- or 6,000-square-kilometre park cannot be treated as one homogeneous space. Each park should be subdivided into operational management zones.

Every zone should have:

1. ranger posts;

2. rapid-response capacity;

3. communication infrastructure;

4. surveillance coverage;

5. emergency access;

6. community liaison structures; and

7. defined response protocols.

The planning principle should be simple: Every part of a national park must belong to a clearly identifiable management territory.

Third: Establish Protected-Area Security Corridors

Road construction inside national parks must be environmentally sensitive, but the answer is not to leave parks inaccessible. Nigeria should develop carefully designed security and emergency access corridors. These should not become conventional highways that fragment ecosystems.Rather, they should be controlled access routes for rangers, emergency response, firefighting, medical evacuation and security operations.

Fourth: Build Strategic Ranger Communities

Nigeria needs a new generation of professional park rangers.They should be trained not only in wildlife conservation but also in:

1. surveillance;

2. GIS;

3. first aid;

4. communication;

5. disaster response;

6. conflict management;

7. intelligence gathering;

8. drone operation;

9. evidence preservation; and

10. community engagement.

Rangers should become part of Nigeria’s wider territorial security architecture.

Fifth: Create Community Buffer Zones

The interface between national parks and surrounding settlements must be deliberately planned. Instead of allowing unplanned settlements to grow randomly around park boundaries, government should create planned community buffer zones.

These should contain:

i. markets;

ii. schools;

iii. health centres;

iv. water facilities;

v. agricultural support services;

vi. police/security posts;

vii. ranger liaison offices;

viii. transport facilities; and

ix. legitimate employment opportunities.

A prosperous community is much harder for criminal organisations to manipulate.

Sixth: Introduce Community-Based Conservation

People living around national parks should not see conservation as the government’s project. They should see it as their economic opportunity. Communities can participate in:

1. ecotourism;

2. licensed agroforestry;

3. conservation enterprises;

4. hospitality;

5. handicrafts;

6. guided tourism;

7. environmental monitoring; and

8. wildlife protection.

A resident who derives legitimate income from a protected landscape has a reason to protect it.

Seventh: Make Ecotourism a Security Instrument

This is one of the most neglected opportunities. A deserted park is difficult to secure. A well-managed park with hotels, visitor centres, research stations, tourist routes, ranger stations and legitimate economic activity creates continuous human presence. Security and tourism should therefore not be viewed as competing objectives. Responsible tourism can become an instrument of territorial occupation by legitimate society.

Eighth: Develop Transboundary Security Planning

The Kainji-Borgu problem demonstrates that state boundaries are inadequate for managing transboundary criminal networks. Nigeria should strengthen cooperation with Benin and Niger Republic around:

1. intelligence sharing;

2. border surveillance;

3. forest monitoring;

4. joint patrols;

5. trafficking control;

6. migration monitoring;

7. community engagement; and

8. coordinated emergency response.

The planning unit should become the cross-border landscape, not merely the local government area.

Ninth: Stop Treating Forests as “Empty Land”

This is perhaps the most important planning lesson. Remote forests are not empty. They contain ecological systems, communities, economic activities, routes, water resources and strategic territorial relationships. When planners ignore them, criminals may occupy them.

Every square kilometre of Nigeria should have an identifiable governance status. Ungoverned space is an invitation to organised criminality.

Tenth: Create a National Protected Areas Security Command

Without creating unnecessary bureaucratic duplication, Nigeria should establish an integrated command mechanism bringing together:

1. National Park Service;

2. Nigerian Army;

3. Nigeria Police Force;

4. Department of State Services;

5. Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps;

6. Nigeria Customs Service;

7. Nigeria Immigration Service;

8. State Governments;

9. Local Government Authorities; and

10. community security structures.

The purpose should not be to militarise every national park. It should be to ensure that conservation, intelligence and security agencies operate from one shared territorial picture.

A NEW CONCEPT: SECURITY THROUGH SPATIAL PLANNING

Nigeria’s response to insecurity has often been reactive.

An attack occurs.

Security forces are deployed.

Criminals retreat.

The operation ends.

The criminals return.

This cycle must stop.

Urban and Regional Planning offers a different philosophy:

1. Prevent the spatial conditions that allow criminality to thrive.

This means identifying vulnerable landscapes before criminal networks consolidate.

It means asking:

1. where are the blind spots?

2. where are the inaccessible forests?

3. where are the ungoverned settlements?

4. where are the abandoned roads?

5. where are the communication gaps?

6. where are the illegal economic activities?

7. where do state boundaries create security gaps?

8. where can criminal groups move from one ecological zone to another?

9. where can a kidnapped victim be concealed?

10. where can armed groups obtain food, fuel, weapons or intelligence?

These are spatial questions. And spatial questions require spatial intelligence.

2. National Parks Should Become Security Buffers, Not Security Threats

There is a danger that the current crisis could lead to an entirely wrong response: abandoning, indiscriminately clearing or excessively militarising national parks. That would be a mistake. Nigeria cannot solve insecurity by destroying its ecological assets. The objective should be to reclaim and secure the parks while preserving their ecological integrity.

A secure national park should become:

1. a biodiversity sanctuary;

2. a climate-resilience asset;

3. a tourism destination;

4. a research centre;

5. a community development catalyst;

6. a cultural heritage landscape; and

7. a territorial security buffer.

That is the future we should pursue.

CONCLUSION: RECLAIM THE TERRITORY

The crisis unfolding around Kainji Lake and the Borgu axis should be treated as a national warning rather than a local incident. The recent mass kidnapping and the President’s order for an immediate rescue operation have once again demonstrated the devastating human cost of Nigeria’s insecurity. But rescue operations, though necessary, are not enough. Nigeria must ask why armed groups are repeatedly able to disappear into vast forests after attacking communities.

We must ask why criminal organisations can establish camps inside territories legally designated for conservation. We must ask why illegal economies can flourish in areas that are supposed to be under federal protection. And we must ask why communities living around some of these protected areas can remain disconnected from the formal development system.

The answer lies partly in our failure to understand national parks as territories requiring continuous planning and governance. A national park is not merely a collection of trees and animals. It is territory. And territory must be planned, governed, connected, monitored and protected. Nigeria has approximately 22,206 square kilometres of national parks. We cannot afford to allow any portion of this strategic territory to become a sanctuary for terrorists, bandits, kidnappers or other criminal networks. The Federal Government should therefore urgently launch a comprehensive National Parks Security and Spatial Reclamation Initiative, beginning with Kainji Lake and subsequently covering all seven national parks. The initiative should combine GIS and remote sensing, professional ranger development, community planning, controlled accessibility, ecological conservation, intelligence-led security, border cooperation and sustainable ecotourism.

The ultimate goal should not simply be to “flush out bandits.”It should be to reclaim the territory permanently. Because when a national park becomes a haven for terror, the problem is no longer only about wildlife conservation.

It is about sovereignty.

It is about territorial governance.

It is about the safety of citizens.

And, ultimately, it is about the capacity of the Nigerian state to occupy, manage and protect every part of the territory entrusted to it.

Nigeria must not allow the forests that were created to preserve life to become forests from which life is destroyed.The time has come to reclaim our national parks-for nature, for development, for tourism, for our communities and, above all, for the security and sovereignty of Nigeria.

Dr. R. B. Ibrahim (08104294271)(https://bit.ly/rafiuibrahim) is an Infrastructure Development Planner, Climate Change Impact Analytics expert, writes on reclaiming Nigeria’s protected landscapes for sustainable national security. He is from the Department of Urban and Regional Planning, Faculty of Environmental Sciences, Osun State University, Osogbo, Nigeria.